In Defense of Modern Music 1

Authors Introduction

It must be discussed in brief the aim of this work. I will have a very detailed and careful explanation of certain misconceptions regarding music as held by the prominent metaphysicians of antiquity and held throughout history up until the romantic period. Primarily, I’m concerned with the solidification of certain consistent and static views, which in reality, facilitate the development of the art as will be proven with historical data. If I achieve my aims, I will simply protect music from allegations of the abrasive and crass personal judgements of man, seemingly fixed on denigrating the entirety with a drunkards elitism. On a more colloquial note, the intricacies of music must be elucidated properly before there are scrutinies which may or may not indirectly steer the great magnitude of the art in society. In this way I can’t help but want to write a good compendium of musical understanding, hopefully articulating what ultimately matters most. If we allow ourselves to delve into the topic at hand without careful consideration of what the giants of old have taught, we will surely fall on our blade when the time comes to reveal the sources of our own understanding.

Pythagoras, Numerical Cosmology and Rhythm

It’s of primary importance to note that the question at hand is one known to transcend notions initially assumed as such, where not only the poets and lyricists but also the philosopher, that “it is not easy to determine the nature of music or why anyone should have a knowledge of it.”¹ The reason being that music seemingly transcends its own complexities when it is treated by the different disciplines in philosophy. When we deal with ethos, we deal with man and the varying complexities attached to the particular task. When one deals with metaphysics, they are ever tasked with dealing with the laws of the universe. However, It’s very well understood, that there are admitted claims of which the philosophers and theorists still share in common, and this, we will explore through their very writings.

A most ancient and legendary source for the definition of music in western tradition can be found in the philosophy of Pythagoras. It is said that Pythagoras founded music theory when he “invented music by determining the ratios of musical concords.”² This event, as legend has it, occurred when he was walking by a blacksmith shop and heard the consonance of the smithies as their hammers clashed down upon the anvil. Nicomachus Gerasa writes:

“one day Pythagoras was deep in thought and seriously considering whether it could be possible to devise some kind of instrumental aid for the ears which would be firm and unerring, such as sigh obtains through the compass and ruler or the surveyors instrument; or touch obtains with the balance or the device of measures. While thus engaged, he walked by a smithy and, by divine chance, heard the hammers beating out iron on the anvil, and mixedly giving off sounds which were most harmonious with one another, except for one combination. He recognized in three sounds the consonance of the octave, the fight and the fourth. But he perceived that the interval between the fourth and the fifth was dissonant in itself but was otherwise complementary to the greater of these two consonances.”³

Nicomachus goes on to describe how Pythagoras plucked on strings with attached weights equal to those of the four hammers, suspended from a take fixed diagonally to the walls of his house. Then he supposedly transferred the idea of weighted strings to strings under analogous amounts of tension on a “string stretcher” (chordotonon), and finally extended the test to “the striking of plates, to auloi and panpipes, to monochords and triangular harps, and the like.”⁴

Interestingly enough, although the legend of the hammers is demonstrably false since the proportions do not have the same relationship to hammer weight and the tones produced by them, it still nevertheless founded a legend and perspective on music that would be referenced until at least the Renaissance.⁵

Pythagoras being the founder of numerical cosmology which would be adapted by the likes of Boethius and St. Augustine among others serves an important role in our examination of music. For Pythagoras, the notion of numerical harmony as the unity of various parts was central to philosophy. To him, mathematics is what investigates cosmological harmony, and of course therefore music as well.⁶ What the particular takeaway is here in regards to the task at hand is to finally tie this numerical emphasis as one that ultimately excludes the consideration of particulars, such as the necessity of a certain instrument or rhythm for music to be as such. This Pythagorean view of mathematical import developed into a blend of neo-platonic and Christian view of pythagorean cosmology in Catholic philosophy. Furthermore, a very important thing to note is the emphasis on numerical rhythm by St. Augustine and Boethius. Since rhythm is the very thing, which discerns time, it is a cosmologically significant aspect in which its denigration to any subordinate role would be incomprehensible. We see this exemplified in the consideration and treatment of this in St. Augustine’s De Musica, where he examines the complexities and intricacies of rhythm for 6 books. So much does he view rhythm as the exemplification of the fundamental element in music that throughout the six books treating it, he uses the Latin, numerus, which can mean either rhythm or number. Certainly a way of denoting importance, not just to music, but life itself.⁷

It is certain that for St. Augustine, “Musica est scientia bene modulandi” (“Music is the science of modulating well”).⁸ “Modulor, in this context, may signify an application of measure to musical quantity, as in rhythm, and not simply musical singing or playing. Thus we have Augustine then explain how the discernment of rhythmic equality and symmetry in music is only one way in which we may identify an order pervasive throughout all creation. For example, the motions of the cosmos demonstrate an appropriate ordering for the soul; the planets move in perfect unity in imitation of eternity, and their rhythms unite earthly things in “the hymn of the universe” (carmini uniuersitatis):”⁹

He writes:

“Let us, therefore, not look askance at what is inferior to us, but let us place ourselves between what is below us and what is above us, with the help of our God and Lord, in such a way that we are not offended by what is inferior but enjoy only what is superior. For the pleasure is like a weight for the soul. And so pleasure sets the soul in its place. “For where your treasure is, there your heart will be also” [Luke 12:34]…In this way, through the rhythmical succession of their times (numerosa successione), the orbits unite the terrestrial things, subjected to the heavenly ones to the hymn, as it were, of the universe.”

In other places we see that “Rhythms, are “numerically ordered movements”¹⁰ – movements that can be “related by numerical measurement” and are “joined together” by ratio.¹¹

Along the same grain, we have the philosophy of music in Boethius left to us in his many works. Chamberlain reduces the philosophical ideas about music of Boethius in De Musica and De Arithmetica into four heads: “(1) the origins of music, (2) the definitions of music and the true musician, (3) the classification of music, and (4) the moral analysis of instrumental music.”¹² And while we will only quickly go over his definition of music for the present task at hand, suffice it to say that the other heads are not wont to be reducible to particular elements of sound itself as Jenkins would have it. For Boethius, the principal definition of music is that “it is all quantity related to quantity. That is, all numerical proportions.”¹³ In another,¹⁴ “Music is the unifying of many things and the concord of separated things, specifically the power that binds all things together out of the two original and contrary “natures” of the Timaeus, the “same” and the “other.”¹⁵

We see that Boethius is concerned with the mathematical aspect founded on the cosmological view of Pythagoras in regards to music. This is in contradistinction to Aristotle and Plato who are certainly more concerned with the ethos of music which we will shortly treat.¹⁶ However, with Boethius and St. Augustine, it cannot be stressed enough that the numerical basis on which they define music is strictly rational and abstract. The particular constituents of what may or may not form conceptualized instruments or sound thereof is idiosyncratic to their view. Anything relating to the aspect of the sound itself, such as the modern notions of timbre and the like are by no means of concern, as the ratios being mathematical objects constitute the essence of music and subordinate all other things. Thus, regardless of what quality of sound a hammer produces from a smithy, if he and the others hit the anvil in accordance to the numerical ratio elucidated by Pythagoras, in their view, what follows is music.¹⁷

It must be clear to any reader at this point that the treatment of rhythm as subordinate and inferior in view of the “parts” of music is certainly alien to a Pythagorean perspective, of which St. Augustine¹⁸ and Boethius adopted and modified properly in view of sound Catholic theology.¹⁹

Mousikē

A thing to note is that the treatment of Mousikē in Aristotle and Plato is that it’s always of the sort that ethos is concerned with. In this, we get a general view of what Mousikē is and its end, but for further considerations about music theory, one must look to the theorists.²⁰ The understanding of the Greek view of Mousikē is integral to not just Plato and Aristotle, but Ancient Greeks as a whole. In the historical sense, we can trace back the meaning as “The multifaceted ‘art of the Muses’²¹ (mousikē) which was one the first, if not the very first, Greek conceptualizations as a unitary craft governed by well-defined principles, premises, and practices.”²²

The difficulties of semantics is self-evident as the weightiness of the meaning is often presumed as such in particular contexts like music education.²³ In other words, many took for granted the meaning of Mousikē in their positive employment and usage, this we will shortly delve into. Throughout Greek antiquity we see the usage of Mousikē as poetry, story-telling, dance, the combination of dancing, singing, and acting, as well as the strictly instrumental. As many today might tend to define music as descriptive, such as expression, or perhaps even catharsis, all it ultimately does is show what difficulties one has if they set their task to strip Mousikē down. This issue with semantics is easily solved by understanding the different modes of viewing Mousikē, carefully illustrated by Aristotle and Plato.²⁴ Although we have different texts which appear to deal with the varying types of music self-evidently held, Aristotle, for his purposes, is able to narrow down the components to exclude other considerations. Both in the Platonic and Aristotelian discussion of music, they share belief in music as movement, of which they also acknowledge and define as a two part art, that of Rhythmos and Harmoniai, and in the specific context of music education, Melos and Rhythmos.

“We see that music is made of Melos (melodies) and Rhythmos (rhythms), and we should know what influence each of these has on education…“²⁵

The distinction to be made naturally is that Melos is of course not Harmoniai, and thus confuse the purpose of mentioning them and the role they ultimately play. In the Ancient Greek understanding, Harmoniai was a self established fact, it meant first and foremost tuning, “the different tension and organization that we can give to strings of a lyre or kithara depending on the piece we have to play.” In its secondary use, it means the mode of which the music is in. “A mode is a set of distinctive intervals in a scale, upon which different melodies can be constructed. Harmonia, in both cases, furnishes the static structure upon which the composer or the performer can base their composition or execution. Unlike harmonia, melody is a movement which can be descending, ascending, jumpy or following the scale step by step. Melody has a progressive feature which harmonia lacks.”²⁶

Once again, the principal reason Aristotle makes this distinction between melody and harmonia is that his interest is particularly in the progressive nature of music, thus melos being fluid and progressive, apt to move to and fro is better suited for his examination of the whole in view of its end.

Mimesis

We also find most consistently in Aristotle, claims that music is a form of imitation (mimesis) and that pieces of music are images of character.²⁷ We also see this view affirmed by Plato in many places.²⁸ This perspective is henceforth, of course, found throughout the Catholic Philosophers of the middle ages.²⁹ The important thing to note is that this view, this understanding of music as to its whatness, isn’t by any means a definitive view, but rather, the fundamental one. In other words, it’s of utmost importance to understand the definition as imitation prior to dealing with specific criteria. Now, this framework so described isn’t exclusive to the ancients but might not be understood as goes the modern perception. In many cases the modern man would not admit that the piece of music he listens to is immediately an image of sorts. Although I’ll show that through the proper understanding of ancient Greek descriptions of music, this is very much in line, not only to their pupils, but ourselves as well.³⁰

A mentioning of Aesthesis and Noesis is imperative as it’s the concept the Greeks used to conceptualize what it is to look, listen to and generally perceive things.³¹ By understanding this, we are able to have a clearer view of how music is a form of imitation as referenced above. Simply put, “it’s the distinction of what we can see (and vision is often used as the most important form of Aesthesis and thus the representative of the other senses), and what we think.”³² To go further, Aristotle and Plato describe Aesthesis as the process of particulars, i.e things seen, heard, touched, etc. press their individual shapes and qualities into the mind of the living organisms via the sense organs. Though there is a variety of opinion in Antiquity regarding the intricacies and interrelations between Aesthesis and Noesis, there is a general consensus on the claim that pieces of music are in fact imitations or images. In this way Sörbom continues that in the framework of Plato and Aristotle, among others, that:

“A piece of music is a humanly made thing the sole function of which is to create a mental image of a double character in the mind of the listener: a mental image of the piece of music as a thing with particular qualities, foremost rhythms and harmonies, and a mental image of something which the piece of music is not, that is, what it represents.”³³

Whether the representation in music is that of individual things or universals is a topic for another discussion.³⁴ Thus with these concepts elucidated we are able to understand the Aristotelian and Platonic definitions of music as ultimately representational impressions set upon the receiver, or in other words, that music is simply a form of imitation (mimesis). The conceptual framework thus described was fundamental to the ancient Greeks to describe the processes of music regarding ethos, the claim that the perception of sound affects the moral character. The importance here to note, that the sounds themselves as representations are not certain depicted things in themselves, nor are they abstractions of emotion or an example of such, but rather just an image of it, “namely something that is similar to but not an instance of anger and this “nothing but similarity in certain respects” is the basic nature of music apart from it’s rhythms, harmonies and shapes as well as it is basic for all other kinds of image and imitation.”

The pivotal thing is that Aristotle and Plato both emphasize the ethical aspect of music as a self-evident fact. This is of course derivative from the basis that music is ultimately an impression (mimesis) and this impression is affective to listeners. The reason this is outlined by me is that the very focus placed on music by Jenkins and others is by and large reducible to their affective qualities on societies at large.³⁵ Thus, when someone is concerned with the now understood imitative aspect in music, they are dealing with the whatness of it. In this way it is simply understood that to define music, specifically, as necessarily containing certain instruments or components, one has disregarded the very notion of what music actually is as is held by the philosophers. However, enough is said on the imitation for now, we shall return to it once again in the discussion of affection.

Aristotle, Politics. trans. B. Jowett. Vlll. ch. 5. 1339 a 15. ↩︎
Anderson, Gene H. “Pythagoras and the Origin of Music Theory.” Indiana Theory Review 6, no. 3 (1983): 35–61. ↩︎
Nicomachus of Gerasa, Manual of Harmonics, 28-29. ↩︎
Ibid ↩︎
Such an example is the Theorica Musicae of 1492 which depicts the discovery of music as originating from Pythagorean mathematical quantifications of nature. ↩︎
His discovery that the interval of an octave may be expressed as a numerical ratio led him to affirm his cosmology as one “that construct the whole universe out of numbers” ↩︎
St. Augustine, De musica, Book VI (cf. p. 7) Trans. Martin Jacobsson ↩︎
De Musica I.2, derived from Varro ↩︎
MacInnis J. Augustine’s De Musica in the 21st Century Music Classroom. Religions. 2015; 6(1):211-220. ↩︎
De musica 1.11. 19 ↩︎
Ibid 1.9. ↩︎
Chamberlain, David S. “Philosophy of Music in the Consolatio of Boethius.” Speculum 45, no. 1 (1970): 80–97. ↩︎
De musica, II. iii, De arithmetica, I. i, pp. 8.139.6. ↩︎
Chamberlain, 81 ↩︎
Though we aren’t interested in discerning the definition of the musician, it’s made clear that the true musicians, to Boethius and Plato, are those who judge by reason the proportions or ratios of music, not those who can play it skillfully. They write that the poet is “engaged in music” as non musicians fail to do, but they are not proper judges of music. This was briefly mentioned above as St. Augustine questions this premise from Plato. ↩︎
This is not to say that Boethius and the Pythagorean influenced perception rejected or even ignored the principle from Aristotle that Music is mimesis, rather, it was even more so true, in light of their understanding in the parallels between “musical elements and the most disparate parts of reality, from the senses, to virtues, all the way to celestial bodies.” See Ravasio, Matteo, “History of Western Philosophy of Music: Antiquity to 1800”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) ↩︎
Boethius also took the Pythagorean paradigm and formed his classifications of music as tripartite, in De Musica, Boethius introduces it as such: Musica mundana – music of the spheres/world; this “music” was not actually audible and was to be understood rather than heard, Musica humana – harmony of human body and spiritual harmony and Musica instrumentalis – instrumental music. In De musica I.2, Boethius describes ‘musica instrumentis’ as music produced by something under tension (e.g., strings), by wind (e.g., aulos), by water, or by percussion (e.g., cymbals). ↩︎
In the same line of thought I would add that the view regarding the musician as an imitator of which the true understanding of music is lacking. in De Musica I.6, performers of music are inferior to those who discern and describe the structure and components of music. Additionally, the fact that performers play for praise or money is an example that they are ethically compromised in their approach to music. Though, it should be said that, on this point, the master and student conversing in De Musica appear to disagree. The student argues for the possibility of a performer who is also educated in the theories of music, and his master does not completely dismiss the idea. MacInnis, 3. De Musica, Book VI ↩︎
See St. Augustines Retractationes I.6 and I.11 for his mature, more theological view in respect to time and the general direction of all things towards God. ↩︎
Such as Boethius prior to the late Renaissance. ↩︎
The earliest accounts of which are by the Poets, Homer and Hesiod, written in Rhythm and Meter to be sung by musicians ‘Let us begin to sing from the Muses of Helicon…’ (Hes. Th. 1.1) ‘Sing, o Goddess, the wrath of Achilles son of Peleus…’ (Hom. Il. 1.1) ↩︎
Another example of a short piece exemplifying the words etymology “begins with an invocation that echoes the opening lines of the great epic poems and asks for literal inspiration, a creative musical breath sent by the Goddess to stir the imagination of human composers: ‘Sing to me, beloved Muse, and start my tuneful strain; may a breeze from your sacred groves now come and rouse my wits’ Ἄειδε μοῦσά μοι φίλη, / μολπῆς δ᾽ ἐμῆς κατάρχου, / αὔρη δὲ σῶν ἀπ᾽ ἀλσέων / ἐμὰς φρένας δονείτω.” Tosca A.C. Lynch, FRSA, Mousikē: The Art of The Muses ↩︎
There are many such accounts in Hellenic history of early education employing the use of Music without hindrance. See Laurie, S. S. “The History of Early Education. Hellenic Education. Chapter III. Education among the Dorian Greeks ↩︎
For example, Aristotle doesn’t focus on Mousikē in regard to theater and poetry suggesting a distinction of genre. Politics viii (see also Pol. viii 1340a14-b26) We find similar treatment in Plato’s Rep. iii 398c-403c but contradistinction to Plato’s Laws ii 665a-c, where the focus is on Mousikē as including chōreia, the art of dancing and singing. ↩︎
Pol.viii 1341b24-25 ↩︎
Cagnoli Fiecconi, Harmonia, Melos and Rhytmos. Aristotle on Musical Education. Ancient Philosophy 36 (2016). (2):409-424. (see West 1992, 190 ff and Aristides Quintilianus De Musica ii, 21, cf. 16.18-17.2, 81.4-6, 130.2, Ptolemy Harmonics ii.12. Barker 1990, 2:341 n. 96, 418, 430 ff., 483, 531) ↩︎
Aristotle, Politics, 1340a 18-22 ↩︎
Plato, Republic, 401B-403 C Laws 655 D and 668 A: “We assert, do we not, that all music is representative (eikastiken) and imitative (mimetiken)?” The Laws, trans. R. G. Bury (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1952) ↩︎
Boethius, De institutione musica, 179 ↩︎
Plotinus, Enneads, VIII ↩︎
Sörbom, Göran. “Aristotle on Music as Representation.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52, no. 1 (1994): 37–46. ↩︎
Ibid. 38 ↩︎
Ibid. 41 ↩︎
See Poetics, ch. IX, 1451a 37-39 ↩︎
Though it is apparent by his words, and my aim here, to refute the novel reduction of the musical art in his definition of it above. ↩︎